Author: Ericson M. Scorsim

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law, with a focus on Technologies, Media, and Telecommunications. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the book “Jogo geopolítico das comunicações 5G – Estados Unidos, China e impacto sobre o Brasil” (The Geopolitical Game of 5G Communications – United States, China, and Impact on Brazil), published on Amazon.

The U.S. Department of Justice has approved new standards for the National Security Agency regarding the collection of intelligence signals (SIGINT), called DoD Manual S-5240.01-A. Intelligence signals are any kind of information of interest to the national security of the United States, such as phone calls, e-mails, data, videos, audios, content on social networks, telegrams, radio frequency communications, credit card data, financial data, radar information, among other information.

The act is based on Executive Order n. 12.333, passed by the Reagan administration. The National Security Agency of the United States is subordinated to the Department of Defense, which contributes to military operations in addition to the intelligence services. Basically, intelligence signal collection refers to obtaining information, data, and communications abroad and from foreigners. Thus, the National Security Agency can target foreign governments, agents, and companies.

The collection of intelligence signals can occur through the interception of radio communication channels, e-mails, satellites, submarine cables, among other techniques. U.S. citizens can only be the target of intelligence signal collection measures exceptionally. The fact is that the NSA has the ability to intercept communications anywhere in the world. The agency can also hack into computer networks anywhere in the world. Moreover, this government agency has the power to intercept cellular phone networks as well as wireless communications. Thus, any cell phone, anywhere on the globe, can be targeted by the NSA, in principle.

The collection of foreign communications serves to access the intelligence and counterintelligence services of other countries. This allows NSA to retain the metadata of communications such as telephone numbers, identification of the source and recipient of calls, e-mail addresses, identification of senders and recipients of messages.

The government act authorizes foreigners’ electronic surveillance, even if they are located outside the United States. The techniques for collecting intelligence signals based on computer monitoring are secret. A detailed study by David Kris called “The NSA’s New SIGINT” was published on the Lawfare website on January 13, 2021. We also recommend reading another historical study of the relations between NSA and telecommunication companies and technology providers: Susan Landau: Under the radar: NSA’s efforts to secure private-sector telecommunications infrastructure, published in the Journal of National Security Law & Policy, vol. 7, pages 411-442. The author presents the historical debates regarding cryptography.

As you can see, the U.S. government’s act intends to have extraterritorial effects, extending its jurisdiction to reach other countries. In 2013, Brazil had its communications intercepted by the National Security Agency. Among the targets were the Presidency of the Republic, Ministries, Embassies, and Petrobras. Ultimately, it is up to Brazil and Brazilian companies to assess this new measure’s geopolitical impact regarding NSA’s actions concerning the protection of its sovereignty. Also, companies with international operations should measure possible geopolitical risks in the face of this new U.S. government regulation. In short, this NSA action may pose a threat to the privacy and confidentiality of communications. Therefore, there must be a debate by national parliaments and appropriate international bodies regarding the limits to the U.S. government on access, collection, interception, retention of personal and non-personal data located in other countries under the pretext of obtaining intelligence signals. 

Thus, international law must evolve to contain government abuses in the interception of communications under the pretext of national security.

*All rights reserved and cannot be reproduced or used without citing the source.

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law, with a focus on Technologies, Media, and Telecommunications.  Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the Communications Law Ebook Collection.  Author of the book “Jogo geopolítico das comunicações 5G – Estados Unidos, China e impacto sobre o Brasil” (The Geopolitical Game of 5G Communications – United States, China, and Impact on Brazil), published on Amazon.

Anatel has released its regulatory agenda for 2021-2022. Among the topics related to the provision of telecommunications services is the bid notice for radio spectrum telecommunications services over fifth-generation networks and the bid notice for a Brazilian satellite’s exploitation rights.

Another aspect refers to the reassessment of the continuity of the switched fixed telephony service, including reversible assets. Also, there will be reassessment regulations related to public emergency services and telecommunications networks’ security. On the other hand, there is the intention of passing a new regulation of consumer rights in telecommunications services.

As for the matter of regulatory inspections, the Agency is seeking a more “responsive” inspection model. There will also be a review of the regulation on the conclusion and monitoring of consent decrees. Also on the agenda is regulating the sharing of poles between electricity distributors and telecommunications service providers. Another item is a reassessment of the relevant market regulations (PGMC – General Plan of Competition Goals).

We highlight the reassessment of rates and contributions applicable to the telecommunications sector. Another topic is the regulation on the so-called TV White Spaces related to the VHF and UHF band to use the idle band of sound and image broadcasting services. Another regulatory point is updating the Frequency Ranges Assignment, Destination, and Distribution Plan according to the results of the World Radiocommunication Conference (PDFF 2019). In this same sense, there is also the intention to review radio frequency regulations related to fixed switched telephone services, multimedia communication services, and personal mobile services.  Another aspect is the new regulation of the satellite sector. The Agency is also aiming to review the regulation on the use of the radio spectrum (“RUE”). On the other hand, there will be a reassessment of radio signal blocking regulations. There will also be measures to streamline regulations and related to transparency.

In sum, these issues on Anatel’s agenda are essential to the future of telecommunications in Brazil, with impacts on several other economic sectors.

*All rights reserved and cannot be reproduced or used without citing the source.

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the Communications Law Collection.  Author of the book “Jogo geopolítico das comunicações 5G – Estados Unidos, China e impacto sobre o Brasil” (The Geopolitical Game of 5G Communications – United States, China, and Impact on Brazil), published on Amazon.  

The United States has passed a law with security requirements for the Internet of Things.

The law is called the Internet of Things Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2020. The agencies responsible for managing the Internet of Things must follow these security parameters. 

Basically, the Internet of things is a network of machine-to-machine communications, integrated by electronic, optical, and acoustic sensors, among others. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) must approve the Internet of Things guidelines to be followed by federal agencies. Among the security requirements are identifying and managing IoT devices’ vulnerabilities, secure product development, device identity management; patching; and configuration management.

The federal agency responsible for infrastructure cybersecurity must update its standards. Information about vulnerabilities in information systems, including IoT devices, must be disclosed. The law also references rules to be followed when procuring technology related to the Internet of Things. The U.S. Comptroller General must briefly brief Congress on IoT-related practices, networks, equipment, and information systems. On this topic, we highlight the business alliance called Global Standard for IoT Security (IoTX), with members such as Facebook, Amazon, Google, T-Mobile, Comcast, and Zigbee, among others.

There are countless applications of the Internet of Things: precision agriculture, energy, medicine, industry, among others. On this note, there is a reference to the Internet of Things in the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act refers to the Internet of Things. Thus, the law provides for creating a workgroup on the Internet of Things, with the participation of the National Institute Standards and Technology, the Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Transportation, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy, among others. The workgroup will identify regulations on the Internet of Things, verifying potential benefits for intelligent traffic, logistics and supply chains, sustainable infrastructure, precision farming, environmental monitoring, public safety, and health. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration will assess the wireless services and radiofrequency spectrum demands.

The law also contemplates actions to support small and medium enterprises in IoT businesses.  IoT and 5G networks increase the risks of cyberattacks. Hence the need to clearly and precisely define cybersecurity standards to be adopted by companies and the regulatory agencies responsible for monitoring their application.

*All rights reserved and cannot be reproduced or used without citing the source.

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the Communications Law Collection.

Brazil is a user of the United States GPS (Global Positioning Satellite) technology. It is a technology for the positioning, navigation, and geolocation of people, objects, vehicles, and places. Military agencies developed this technology. And it is currently under the control of the United States Air Force.

It is considered a dual-use technology, that is, with military and civilian application. Thus, the military authorities have allowed its use by civilians. The geolocation system is based on satellite telecommunications infrastructure distributed around the globe. Currently, there is a constellation of 33 (thirty-three) satellites scattered around the globe that guarantee GPS operation. There is a GPS antenna on Ascension Island, located in the Atlantic, that can collect intelligence signals in the region.

On the military side, GPS is fundamental in command and control systems, intelligence, reconnaissance, tracking and surveillance, intelligent weapon positioning, and target location accuracy. On the subject, Graham Allison explains: “Satellites provide a crucial link in almost any U.S. military venture, from alerts on enemy ballistic missile launches to image production and weather forecasts, and operations planning. Global Positioning Satellites are responsible for the accuracy of almost all guided weapons and allow ships, planes, and ground units to know where they are on the battlefield. The United States depends on this technology more than any of its competitors. Without it, the commander-in-chief cannot transmit their orders to the platoons on land, the ships at sea, and everything in between. Anti-satellite weapons range from ‘kinetic’ weapons that physically destroy the target, entangling the orbit with debris, to more discreet systems that use lasers to block satellite signals or ‘overshadow’ them and leave them inoperative”.[1]

It should be noted that GPS has numerous civil applications in the economy: transport (vehicle and cargo tracking), commerce (consumer geolocation for commercial advertising purposes), financial system (controlling user id and digital payments), air navigation, maritime transport (ship navigation, cargo, and fleet tracking), precision agriculture (using GPS-guided drones), geosensing, space, meteorology, railways, mapping, environmental services, public safety, among others.  For example, agricultural machinery has GPS. Without connectivity, however, this agricultural equipment cannot connect to the Internet network. It is possible to make estimates about the agricultural crop through GPS and satellite and, thus, influence commodities’ international prices. As an example, the Brazilian Agricultural Agency (Embrapa) uses earth observation images provided by NASA. The agricultural activity is intertwined with the rural credit system, mediated by technology.

In 2020, the Central Bank of Brazil issued Resolution n. 4796, of 04/02/2020, which deals with procedures for reporting agricultural crop losses and applying for insurance coverage under the Proagro program. It states that in the event of the impossibility of an on-site technical visit, losses may be proven remotely. Thus, the Brazilian Central Bank recognizes the possibility of using “satellite images or other remote sensing tools,” as well as database consultation by systems such as Sisdagro (system to support decisions in agriculture and livestock) of the National Institute of Meteorology (INMET) and the Embrapa’s Temporal Vegetation Analysis System (SAT). 

In short, aerospace technologies have a significant impact on Brazilian agriculture. That’s why care must be taken when it comes to protecting Brazil’s agricultural data.   The European Union is adopting rules for agricultural data protection to avoid unfair competition for its farmers. Another application of GPS is the use of technology in planning the opening of retail stores. The number of people circulating in a given geographical area of a city is measured to verify the region’s economic potential.

The GPS is fully compatible with mobile telecommunications infrastructures by mobile phones. The U.S. Air Force has projects to advance the efficiency of the GPS system and mobile-cellular networks. Thus, any mobile phone on the globe may be located by GPS. In this aspect, GPS technology is truly relevant to collecting intelligence signals by the U.S. government. Frequently, in conflict areas, the GPS signal is interfered with by denial of access to services.  These are the systems of countries allied to the US GPS: the European Union’s Galileo system, Japan’s GZSS, India’s Navic. In 2018, the FCC authorized the provision of Galileo services in the United States. The United Kingdom is studying the creation of its own satellite navigation system. Systems not aligned with the United States: Russia’s GLONASS and China’s Beidou. Brazil does not have its own satellite positioning system. Thus, it is a mere user of the United States GPS system. Therefore, there are geopolitical risks for Brazil in the adoption of US GPS technology. Simply put, the risk is that the United States may, for various reasons, decide to deny access to the GPS system at some point. Plus, there are risks of economic and military espionage by the GPS system. Also, Brazil will depend on access to the US GPS technology for its military operations. For Brazil to have full technological sovereignty, it must adopt its own satellite geopositioning system. Otherwise, technological dependence will mean restrictions to international competitiveness and even risks to national defense.

Hence, Brazil needs new geostrategy regarding satellite positioning and navigation technology, intending to build its own domestic system. The Brazilian nation will be grateful! 

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[1] Allison, Graham. A caminho da guerra. Os Estados Unidos e a China conseguirão escapar da Armadilhas de Tucídides? Rio de Janeiro: Intrínseca, 2020.
Original: Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the Communications Law Collection

            The United States Department of Defense created the Global Positioning System (GPS). Its primary purpose is to ensure geolocation information of people, objects, and vehicles, among others. To this day, it’s under the supervision of the US Department of Defense and Air Force.  However, the technology is also authorized for civilian use.[1] Despite the civilian and military benefits of GPS, it is one of the technologies symbolizing the era of electronic surveillance by governments and companies. It is one of the most invasive, as it provides real-time information on the location of people.  Thus, the master technology in real-time data collection by telecommunication networks is a technology considered dual-use, civil and military. We highlight that GPS has numerous applications in the economy: transport (vehicle and cargo tracking), commerce (consumer geolocation for commercial advertising purposes), air navigation, maritime transport (ship navigation), precision agriculture, geosensoring, space, railways, mapping, environmental services, public safety, among others.  For example, agricultural machinery has a GPS system. Without connectivity, however, this agricultural equipment cannot connect to the Internet network.  The GPS system is fully compatible with mobile telecommunications infrastructures by mobile phones. The US Air Force has projects to advance the efficiency of GPS and mobile-cellular networks. Thus, any mobile phone on the globe may be located by GPS. In this aspect, GPS technology is very relevant in intelligence signals collection by the US government. It serves as a tool in military operations in times of war.

            The geolocation system is based on satellite telecommunications infrastructure distributed around the globe. There is currently a constellation of 33 (thirty-three) satellites scattered around the globe that guarantee GPS operation. There is a GPS antenna on Ascension Island, located in the Atlantic, that can collect intelligence signals in the region. 

            There are several bills on GPS. One of them is the Geolocational Privacy and Surveillance Act – GPS Act.[2] There are rules on interception and dissemination of geolocation information. Also, the bill prohibits the use of geolocation information as evidence. Moreover, it provides for accountability in case of civil damage by interception, disclosure, or violation of geolocation information. Also, there is a rule on fraud to obtain geolocation information.

            But what is the reason for this bill? The US investigating authorities often use technology to obtain information on crime suspects’ geolocation movements, sometimes even without a court order allowing that. There was a case taken to the Courts regarding the deployment of a GPS vehicle tracking system to monitor a crime suspect’s movements. There have been abuses in the use of GPS that have motivated civil rights entities to seek the setting of legal limits, to protect the privacy and security of US citizens.[3]

            In another case, the law enforcement authorities adopted software that simulates the signal from cell phone towers to intercept communications without a court order, which led to the case’s judicialization.[4]

            The bill referenced above deals with the limits on deploying satellite signal reception stations in United States territory by foreign governments. The purpose of the rule is to control access to GPS technology by governments from other countries.

            On the other hand, the Fiscal Year 2019 bill provides that funds related to the transport sector cannot be used to finance GPS tracking of passengers in motor vehicles. Thus, the measure seeks to establish parameters for the privacy of US citizens.

            The US National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2020 proposes creating a prototype global satellite navigation program capable of receiving signals to expand the resilience capacity of military positions. These are the systems of countries allied to the US GPS: the European Union’s Galileo system, Japan’s GZSS, India’s Navic. The United Kingdom is studying the creation of its own satellite navigation system. Systems not aligned with the United States: Russia’s GLONASS and China’s Beidou.

            Brazil does not have its own satellite positioning system. Thus, it is a mere user of the United States GPS. Therefore, there are geopolitical risks for Brazil in the adoption of US GPS technology.  Note that the United States has the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act that allows the interception of foreign communications.  In this aspect, to protect Brazil’s national defense of and the confidentiality of Brazilian mobile telecommunications networks’ communications, the Brazilian authorities must act more effectively to protect Brazilians’ communications against the risk of interception by foreign authorities.

            A report from Homeland Security to the United States Congress explains that the loss of the GPS signal implies serious damage to the US economy. Thirty days without a GPS signal could cost the US economy $1 billion a day.[5]

With 5G and IoT technology, there are increased risks of GPS monitoring invading individuals’ and companies’ privacy and cyber-attacks on mobile telecommunication networks. Therefore, legislators must act to protect personal and non-personal data.

            GPS technology undoubtedly holds numerous economic utilities. There is valuable information in mobile telecommunications networks. However, this technology deals with personal data related to the geolocation of people. It is the symbol technology of business and state and electronic hypervigilance, including real-time data collection.  There are also risks of cyber attacks on mobile telecommunications networks. Therefore, the protection of privacy and confidentiality of communications and personal data security related to geolocation is a significant factor to be considered by Brazilian legislators and Anatel, the agency responsible for the telecommunications sector.               

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[1] www.gps.gov

[2] The Geolocation Bill reads:  “geolocation information” means with respect to a person, any information that is not the content of a communication, concerning the location of a wireless communication device or tracking device (as defined in section 3177) that, in whole or in part, is generated by or derived from the operation of that device and that could be used to  determine or infer information regarding the location of the person”.

[3]On this topic, see: Farivar, Cyrus. Habeas Data. Privacy the rise of surveillance tech. New York: Melville Publishing, 2018.

[4] Habeas data, privacy the rise of surveillance tech, work cited, p. 174.

[5] Homeland Security. Report on Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) Backup and Complementary Capabilities to the Global Positioning System (GPS). National Defense Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2017 Report to Congress: PNT Requirements, and Analysis of Alternatives, April, 8, 2020.

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo – USP. Author of the Communications Law Collection.

The United States and China dispute global leadership over 5G technology. China has Huawei as one of its main players. The United States is lagging behind in this technology race, as there is no US company leading in 5G technology. The United States, claiming reasons of a threat to its national security, has banned Huawei from providing 5G technology to its telecommunications networks.  The US government accuses the Chinese company of promoting espionage on behalf of the Chinese government. There are also charges of intellectual property and data theft. The company denies all severe charges. Despite President Biden’s recent election, the tendency is for the US to maintain this policy of excluding Chinese technology from telecommunications networks. Also, the United States is pressing allied countries to align their geostrategic position to ban China’s 5G technology.

 In this sense, the US government has threatened to no longer share intelligence information if allied countries do not exclude such 5G technology from their telecommunications networks. Thus, the US government has adopted the Clean Path, i.e., 5G networks, to exclude equipment and technology supplied by Chinese companies in cloud computing infrastructures, telecommunications network infrastructures, internet networks, application stores, and submarine cable networks. For the moment, there are signs that the Brazilian government may integrate this Clean Path program to exclude the supply of Huawei 5G technology in its national telecommunications networks. The US government’s narrative has been the subject of strong criticism. As the United States is not competitive in 5G technology, has it decided to adopt a protectionist tactic with the denial of global free trade because it is losing the competition to China? Another issue is that the US government accuses China of spying. But doesn’t the United States carry out espionage against foreign governments, companies, and people? It should be noted that in 2013, the Brazilian National Congress opened a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate espionage activities conducted by the National Security Agency of the United States against Brazilian targets: citizens, companies, and authorities. It is important to note the institutional context of the United States.  The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) obliges telecommunications companies to adopt equipment standards that allow the interception of telecommunications communications.  In principle, the law applies only to US companies and those located in US territory. Another US law is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which allows US authorities to intercept communications abroad, including allowing the collection of intelligence signals (data relevant to US national security). Therefore, under this law, mass electronic surveillance of foreign governments, companies, and persons. In this context, global technology companies such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, among others, may be asked to collaborate with the US government on national intelligence issues. Another law is the Cloud Act, which allows US authorities to access data stored on servers located abroad in the event of investigations.

Additionally, the Export Control Reform Act deals with control measures in the export of technologies considered dual use, i.e., with both civil and military use. Thus, microchips, satellite technologies, fiber optics, submarine cables, GPS are considered dual-use technologies. In fact, the Internet itself is considered a dual-use infrastructure. Therefore, the US government seeks to restrict Huawei’s access to US companies’ microchip technology.  Also, the United States leads an international intelligence alliance called Five Eyes, along with the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. This alliance serves to collect intelligence signals across the globe. On the other hand, the National Security Agency is the government agency responsible for conducting electronic surveillance activities and collecting intelligence signals for the United States across the globe. Remember that the NSA has already conducted espionage against Brazil, supposedly an ally of the United States, in 2013.  Given this context, it is up to Brazil, as a sovereign nation, to adopt the most appropriate measures to protect the confidentiality of the communications of Brazilian governments, companies, and citizens. 

The Brazilian Congress is the competent authority to debate this issue. The President of the Republic does not have the power to deliberate exclusively on this matter. The mission of regulating 5G is shared between the government and the National Congress, precisely because it involves national defense issues.  Note that the European Union has adopted an intermediate solution to partially exclude Chinese technology from central areas of telecommunications networks, allowing its presence only in peripheral areas. It is unacceptable that Brazil cannot defend itself against the United States or against China or any other country.

Faced with the 5G issue, any omission by the Brazilian government and the National Congress to adopt measures to protect the integrity and confidentiality of communications will represent a serious attack on national sovereignty. After all, Brazil is not the backyard of the United States; it must protect its national interest above the interest of any allied country. In the geopolitical game between the United States and China, Brazil must protect the integrity, confidentiality, and privacy of Brazilian communications.  

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the Communications Law Collection.

The United States government has passed its national strategy for emerging and critical technologies. The goal is to ensure the United States’ leadership in emerging and critical technologies. Thus, it seeks to promote primary innovation for national security in research and development. Also, another strategic goal is to protect the competitive technological advantages of the United States.

In this sense, it wants to engage the private sector in cooperation with the government sector. Ultimately, the strategic national security goal is to advance the United States’ influence in the context of hypercompetition among countries.  The priority actions for the promotion of primary national security innovation are: the development of a global workforce, attracting and retaining inventors and innovators; stimulating the use of private capital and private experience to build and innovate; reducing regulations, policies, and bureaucratic processes; leading the development of technological norms, standards, parameters and models of governance; supporting the development of primary innovation among academic institutions, laboratories, support infrastructure, investment funds, and industry; prioritizing research and development in the government budget; developing and adopting technological applications within the government; encouraging public-private partnerships; building technology partnerships with allies and partners.

Another strategic goal is to protect US technology, with collaboration between companies, industries, universities, and government agencies. Thus, the priority actions to protect the technological advantage of the United States are: ensure that competitors do not adopt illicit means to acquire US intellectual property, research, development or technology; require design security at the preliminary stages of technology development, and cooperate with allies and partners to take similar actions, to protect the integrity of the research and development enterprise through research security measures in academic institutions, laboratories, and industry, with balanced contributions from foreign researchers; ensure the appropriation of technologies through the use of export control and regulatory laws as well as multilateral export regimes; engage allies and partners to develop their own procedures similar to those in the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS). The US government has adopted a list of emerging and critical technologies: communications and networking technologies, semiconductors and microelectronics, space technologies, advanced computing, advanced conventional weapons, advanced engineering materials, advanced manufacturing, advanced sensors, airborne technologies and devices, agricultural technologies, artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, biotechnologies, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials mitigation technologies, data science and storage, leading-edge computing distribution technologies, energy technologies, human-machine interfaces, medical and public health technologies, quantum information science.

In short, the US national security policy focuses on maintaining its global influence and competitive edge in advanced technologies. The measure is a reaction to China’s advances in emerging and critical technologies. This US policy impacts 5G technology, as much of the equipment is integrated by semiconductors (microchips) manufactured by US companies. Besides, the government establishes a strict export control of semiconductors related to 5G technology to restrict access by Chinese companies due to the trade dispute with China. On the other hand, a representative of the US government declared the opening of a credit line through Exim Bank (the United States Bank of Imports and Exports) to finance the acquisition of 5G technology by telecommunications companies in Brazil. Also, National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien was in Brazil on an official mission, with meetings with the federal government and Fiesp – the São Paulo Federation of Industries.

As one can see, 5G technology is a matter of interest for US national security. But, of course, this interference of the United States in Brazil’s national affairs must be analyzed from the perspective of national sovereignty. 

Since when is it up to the United States to “protect” Brazil’s telecommunications networks?

It is known that the United States, in its geostrategic vision, sees Brazil as an area of its strategic environment in the southern hemisphere. The United States is suspicious of Huawei, accusing it of spying practices. But in 2013, Brazil was the target of international espionage. And by whom? By the United States National Security Agency. This has even led to the establishment of a Parliamentary Investigation Committee. Also, Huawei is already present in Brazil as a supplier of telecommunications infrastructure equipment for almost two decades. So far, there is no reason to distrust its telecommunications equipment. We do not seek to defend either the United States or China. All that matters is Brazil First! Brazil is being used as a “satellite country” in the United States and China’s geopolitical dispute. For this reason, positioning oneself openly on one side of the geopolitical game will imply suffering consequences, and Brazilian companies will be under more significant geopolitical risks. Thus, a geostrategy of technological neutrality may be the most appropriate path to protect Brazil’s interests. Therefore, Brazil’s national interest requires the protection of its telecommunications network infrastructure from the risks and threats of espionage, whether from US intelligence services or China and/or third parties. In this regard, any partnership and/or alliance that Brazil enters must be supported by relationships of trust, loyalty, reciprocity, and good faith.  If the partner is unreliable and/or does not show trust, the relationship becomes problematic. A policy of blind trust in the United States is dangerous for Brazil. Intelligent geostrategy for Brazil on 5G requires prudence, assessment of the facts, and geopolitical pragmatism, but also verifying the historic hegemonic position of the United States in the continent.

The most sovereign geostrategic alternative is for Brazil to take the lead in technological leadership, forming a range of international allies, in addition to the United States and China. Thus, the national economy and the concept of national defense must be considered, with the Brazilian interest prevailing, and not American First! The omission of the Brazilian State to protect telecommunications networks’ security against any invaders is an attack on national sovereignty.

The matter of 5G poses geopolitical risks, challenges, and economic opportunities for Brazil. At stake is the future of the digital economy in Brazil and the respective influences and control.

Ericson Scorsim. Lawyer and Consultant in Communication Law. Ph.D. in Law from the University of São Paulo (USP). Author of the Communications Law Collection.

Copel (Companhia Paranaense de Energia – the electricity utility company from the Brazilian State of Paraná) published a public offering auction notice for 100% (one hundred percent) of the shares of Copel Telecomunicações S.A., a subsidiary of Copel. Please note that Copel Telecomunicações is only authorized to provide specialized services, in the sub-modality of specialized telecommunications network and multimedia communication services. Thus, the company is authorized to provide broadband fiber optics internet services and telecommunication services.

Its main asset is the ownership of a fiber-optic network in the territory of Paraná. The criterion for selecting the auction winner is based on the highest price offered for the shares. The auction is coordinated by B3 S.A, Brazil, Bolsa, Balcão, the Brazilian Stock Market.

The minimum bid is one billion, four hundred and one million, ninety thousand, and three hundred reais (BRL 1,401,099,300.00). The auction is open to Brazilian or foreign companies, financial institutions, investment funds, supplementary pension plans, among others. In the case of participation of investment funds, the administrators must present a power of attorney for participation in the auction and assuming the obligations arising therefrom. Companies may participate as a consortium. The price proposal collateral to be pledged must be in the amount of seventy million, fifty-four thousand, and five hundred and fifteen reais (BRL 70,054.515.00). 

There are rules in the public offering notice on legal qualification and proof of fiscal and labor regularity. Also, participants must fill out the statement templates provided for in the annexes to the public notice, including the statement of no cross-ownership in violation of the Brazilian legislation, which forbids controlling more than one telecommunications or broadcasting company.  Also, interested parties may make technical visits to the company headquarters to obtain further information. 

The interested parties must sign a confidentiality agreement to perform the due diligence procedures at the company headquarters. The final deadline for challenging the public notice is October 28, 2020. That is also the final deadline for sending questions in the virtual information room – data room.

In its turn, the Public Tender Committee will disclose the ruling on any challenges to the public notice by November 3, 2020. The documents must be delivered by November 5, 2020. The signing of the share purchase agreement is scheduled for January 14, 2021.